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Abstract
The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has rapidly emerged as a signif-
icant threat to global public health, in particular because – as is not
uncommon with novel pathogens – there is no effective pharmaceutical
treatment or prophylaxis to the viral syndrome it causes. In the absence of
such specific treatment modalities, the mainstay of public health response
rests on non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as social distanc-
ing. This paper contributes to the understanding of social distancing
against SARS-CoV-2 by quantitatively analysing the statistical dynamics
of disease propagation as a differential game, and estimating the relative
costs of distancing versus not distancing, identifying marginal utility of
distancing based on known population epidemiological data about SARS-
CoV-2 and concluding that unless the costs of distancing vastly exceed the
cost of illness per unit time, social distancing remains a dominant strat-
egy. These findings can assist in solidly anchoring public health responses
based on social distancing within a quantitative framework attesting to
their effectiveness.
1 Introduction
Where an infectious disease is not amenable to population-level prevention
through vaccination and risks are non-trivial, non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) remain the principal tool of public health to respond to an outbreak.
This is the case with novel infectious diseases that have no specific treatment
and no prophylactic (vaccine) available. In the absence of pharmaceutical in-
terventions of proven effectiveness, in particular prophylactically, the main pub-
lic health response to the emerging pandemic of COVID-19, a viral syndrome
caused by the (+)ssRNA virus SARS-CoV-2 (order Nidovirales, family Coron-
aviridae, genus Betacoronavirus, subgenus Sarbecovirus), has rested principally
on NPIs. [1–4] At their core, all NPIs share a quintessential relationship to so-
cial distancing, either through directly encouraging social distancing, limiting
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transmission potential by reducing public facilities for such encounters that may
transmit the pathogen (’lockdowns’), reducing gatherings and social interactions
that carry such risk (’large-gathering bans’), suspending economic activities that
inherently carry the risk of social interactions or modifying the framework of
activities to reduce such interactions (e.g. transitioning to remote work).
From the perspective of game theory, social distancing can be viewed as a
non-cooperative game of a population P1...n of size n, where at any given time
t ∈ [t0, tf ], each player pi adopts the strategy σ(pi, t). For the sake of simplicity,
we will assume two fundamental axioms about social distancing behaviours:
1. There exist two strategy choices, δ and ¬δ (distancing and not distancing,
respectively). At any given time, any agent pi ∈ P can opt exclusively for
one of these two options, i.e. the strategy set S(pi) is the set {δ,¬δ}.
2. Where a player pi makes a strategy choice σ(pi, t) ∈ S(pi) at time t,
they implement it perfectly, i.e. the efficiency of every player pi ∈ P in
implementing their strategy σ(pi, t) is equal.
Then, for the entire population P , the aggregate population level strategy
σ¯(P, t) can be described as the sum of all strategies σ(pi, t)|pi ∈ P . We can
then assign a value σˆ to each strategy, whereby the strategy of distancing, δ, is
assigned the value of 1 and the strategy of not distancing, ¬δ, the value of 0.
For any given discrete time t ∈ [t0, tf ], where tf would be an endpoint (such
as eradication, elimination, natural extinction of the pathogen, the availability
of a vaccine or a combination thereof), we may then define two disjoint sets,
Pδ(t) and P¬δ(t), where
∀pj ∈ Pδ(t), σ(pj , t) = δ
∀pk ∈ P¬δ(t), σ(pk, t) = ¬δ
(1)
so that |Pδ(t)|+ |P¬δ(t)| = |P | = n. Then, for any t in discrete time t ∈ [t0, tf ],
we define the overall factor of social distancing for a population P at time t,
δ(P, t)
δ(P, t) =
Pδ(t)
n
= 1− P¬δ(t)
n
(2)
which can also be expressed as a function of strategies σ(p1...n) as
δ(P, t) =
∑n
i=1 σˆ(pi, t)
n
(3)
In other words, the overall factor of social distancing at time t, δ(P, t) is
the average of the value the function σˆ assigns to each player’s strategy over
the entire population P . For simplicity’s sake, we will assume that the decision
process takes the shape of a continuous and simultaneous game in discrete time,
and agents can instantly switch strategies with no cost (other than the cost of
the strategy itself). It then holds that
2
1. A player pi ∈ P opting for strategy σδ (social distancing) will incur cd,
the immediate costs of distancing. These may be social (lessened social
interaction), psychological (lessened access to support systems), economic
(lower access to facilities to earn) or simple matters of convenience (ac-
cess to amenities). While cd is somewhat dependent on δ(P, t) (thus not
distancing does not yield a benefit to a lone player in terms of access to
amenities if all of these closed due to widespread social distancing), it can
be assumed to be largely constant.
2. Compared to a person opting for strategy σδ, a person pi ∈ P opting
for strategy σ¬δ will not incur the fixed cost cd, but will instead incur a
relative additional cost ri(P, t)ci, where ci denotes the constant cost of
illness and ri(P, t) is the risk of contracting illness when not distancing, a
function of δ(P, t).
This allows us to identify the cost function J(σ, t) for any σ ∈ {δ,¬δ} at
time t for each individual pi ∈ P as
J(σδ, t) = cd
J(σ¬δ, t) = ri(P, t)ci
(4)
Then, for every population level aggregate strategy σ¯(P, t) associated with
the social distancing value δ(P, t) in the way described in Equation (3), the
overall social cost of σ¯(P, t) can be conceptualised as
J¯(P, t) = n
(
δ(P, t)cd + (1− δ(P, t))ri(P, t)ci
)
(5)
For the entire time space [t0, tf ], the total social cost is then
J¯(P ) =
tf−t0∑
ti=0
J(P, ti) = n
tf−t0∑
ti=0
(
δ(P, ti)cd + (1− δ(P, ti))ri(P, ti)ci
)
(6)
The principal concern of this paper is not with individual action but with
analysis of decision strategies on a population level. This paper will in the
following conceptualise infectious disease in a population as a differential game
over a differential equation form of the compartmental model first described
by Kermack and McKendrick [5]. This model has been widely adapted and
adopted since its publication in 1927, [6–8] and building on it, we will go on to
identify within the statistical dynamics of that differential game the equilibria
that govern ideal societal decision-making.
3
2 Methods
2.1 The ordinary differential equations of disease dynam-
ics
Given a population of n under the assumption that reinfection is sufficiently
rare so as to be ignored at a population level, as appears to be the case for
SARS-CoV-2, [9–11]), the dynamics of subpopulations with respect to infection
can be modelled as a system of ordinary differential equations
dS
dt
= −βSI
n
dI
dt
=
βSI
n
− γI
dR
dt
= γI
(7)
under the assumption of a closed, static population, i.e. neglecting for the time
being the vital dynamics (birth, unrelated death, migration) of the population.
Thus, S + I + R = n, where S represents susceptible individuals, I represents
infected/infectious individuals and R accounts for removed individuals (mor-
tality and recovery to immunity). In addition, due to the closed population
assumption,
dS
dt
+
dI
dt
+
dR
dt
= 0 (8)
Furthermore, the factors β and γ in Equation (7) relate to each other as
R0 =
β
γ
|γ > 0 (9)
The fraction βγ equals the basic reproduction number, R0. For SARS-CoV-
2, estimates of R0 range from 1.4 to 6.49, with studies that relied on statis-
tical estimation of R0 ranging from 2.20 to 3.58, with an average of 2.67
[12]
γ, on the other hand, can be estimated as the inverse of the average num-
ber of days of illness (γ−1, sometimes also described as τ). This value τ has
been identified by studies of the initial infection dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 to
be approximately 8.5 ± 3.9 days. [13,14] Even in the absence of firm evidence
as to whether SARS-CoV-2 infection followed by recovery would engender life-
long immunity or not, [15–17] it can be assumed in the short term – based on
evidence from MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV – that at least in the immediate af-
termath of disease and recovery, survivors remain immune, [18] and consequently
dR
dt ≥ 0 for any t ∈ [t0, tf ], i.e. the number of removed individuals (R) is strictly
monotonously increasing over time. The inverse is true, for the same reasons,
for dSdt and the number of susceptible individuals (S). Numerical solutions to
this system of differential equations have been calculated using odepack via
SciPy 1.5.1 [19] on Python 3.6, and are described in Figure 1 describes some
analytical solutions for the differential equations of Equation (7) over a range
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Figure 1: Some quantitative solutions for the SIR model’s population dynamics
over values of R0 between 1.5 and 6.5, and values of γ
−1 between 4.6 and 12.4
over a base population of 10,000 and a seed population of 0.1% infected initially.
For each plot, β is inferred from R0 and γ using Equation (9). The susceptible
population is displayed in blue, while infected/infectious cases are marked in
red and removed cases in green.
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Figure 2: Contour diagrams of numeric solutions for susceptible, infectious and
removed (S, I and R) compartment sizes for a base population of 10,000 in-
dividuals with a seed population of 0.1% infected, under the assumption of an
R0 of 2.67 and γ of
1
8.5 . As this figure indicates, the ’critical mass’ of social
distancing takes place in the δ range of 0 to 0.4, and thus even modest increases
in social distancing participation at low levels can make a significant difference
in the number of infectious cases.
of plausible values of R0 and γ, with β inferred from γ and R0 through the
relationship described in Equation (9).
2.2 Population strategy contingent solutions to popula-
tion dynamics
Given a population that then adopts an aggregate strategy σ¯(P, t) at time t
that results in δ(P, t) adherence (or in Reluga’s terms, investment [20]) to social
distancing, the flow from S to I is reduced by a corresponding factor. This allows
us to rewrite Equation (7) so that for an aggregate strategy σ¯(P, t) yielding δ,
the populations can be characterised as
dS
dt
= −βSI − δβSI
n
dI
dt
=
βSI − δβSI
n
− γI
dR
dt
= γI
(10)
Solutions to this system of differential equations have been calculated and
are presented in Figure 2. Importantly, this allows us to identify the marginal
utility Uˆ(P, t) as
Uˆ(P, t) =
∂I(P, t)
∂δ(t)
(11)
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Figure 3: Marginal utility of social distancing in a population P of δ(P ) adher-
ence over time. The marginal utility is defined as the vertical component of the
gradient of infected individuals. The plot draws on a base population of 10,000
individuals with a seed population of 0.1% infected, under the assumption of an
R0 of 2.67 and γ of
1
8.5 .
i.e. the partial derivative of I(P, t) over δ(P, t). Thus, for a population-level
strategy σ¯(P, t) associated with δ(P, t), there exists a marginal utility function
Uˆ(P, t) given γ and R0 that indicates the marginal utility at any given value of
δ(P, t). This, too, can be numerically ascertained, and is shown on Figure 3.
2.3 Cost, risk and strategy
Any strategy σ has a cost J(σ, t), as stated in Section 1, and the aggregate
cost of n individuals p1...n ∈ P each adopting, respectively, strategy σ1...n, is∑n
i=0 J(σi, t). But since strategies are limited (one may, at any given time, ei-
ther engage in social distancing or not, assuming for simplicity’s sake that those
who do so are entirely successful), for any aggregate strategy σ¯(P, t) resulting
in a level of distancing described by δ(P, t),
J¯(P, t) =
δ(P,t)n∑
i=0
Jδ +
(1−δ(P,t))n∑
j=0
J¬δ (12)
where Jδ is the cost of social distancing for discrete unit time and J¬δ is the cost
of not distancing for the same unit time. The latter of these is not constant,
as Equation (4) shows, but a function of a constant cost of infection, ci, and
the risk of infection (ri), which in turn is contingent on I(t) and δ(t). Thus,
Equation (12) can be reformulated (once again, in discrete time) as
J¯(P, t) = δ(P, t)ncd + (1− δ(P, t))nJ¬δ (13)
which expands to
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J¯(P, t) = δ(P, t)ncd + (1− δ(P, t))nri(t)ci (14)
For a susceptible individual pi ∈ S, the risk of infection ri(t) in discrete time
is the proportional likelihood of infection, or in other words,
ri(t) =
βS(t)I(t)
n2
(15)
While quantification of costs of illness is difficult, quantification of the eco-
nomic, social and emotional costs of social distancing is an even more com-
plex task. However, we may, for values of δ(P, t), calculate cost fractions
φ(P, t) = cdci (P, t), where
φ(P, t) =
cd
ci
(P, t) =
(1− δ(t))R0γS(t)I(t)
δ(t)n2
(16)
This cost fraction indicates the relative disequilibrium between the cost of
distancing and the cost of illness when adjusted for risk – in other words, for
any given value of δ(P, t) at t, the cost fraction indicates an inflection point.
As long as the cost of distancing is less than φci, social distancing at δ(P, t) or
above is the optimum strategy. As numerical estimation of this cost fraction
(Figure 4) shows, social distancing is almost always the preferred strategy at
equal cost (black line). The contour lines in Figure 4 indicate what ratio the
cost of distancing has to be to the cost of illness at a given value of δ(P, t)
to make distancing no longer an optimal strategy. So, for instance, a φ of
0.05 denotes the isorisk curve over t where, at given δ(P, t), distancing is the
preferable solution as long as its costs are less than, or equal to, 0.05 times that
of illness or less.
3 Results
3.1 Strategies of social distancing
As Figure 2 indicates for empirically ascertained values of R0 and γ based on the
literature on SARS-CoV-2, [12,21] social distancing can have an overwhelmingly
significant effect on the number of infectious individuals in a closed population,
and the magnitude of this effect is dependent on the number of persons in the
population already engaged in social distancing. This effect is most pronounced
early in the epidemic (approx. 2-3 γ−1 days), and the effect is most significant
where less than half of the population is engaged in social distancing. Thus,
unlike collective immunity in the case of vaccination, which often necessitates a
fairly high level of penetration (typically estimated as 1−R−10 ), social distancing
can play a meaningful role in particular where much of the population is not
yet engaged in such behaviour. This result can meaningfully inform a policy
of encouraging individual social distancing early in an outbreak and dispel the
misperception that marginal action is unnecessary unless a critical volume of
individuals are already participating.
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Figure 4: Cost fraction φ = cdci of social distancing in a population P of δ(P, t)
adherence over time, based on a population of 10,000 individuals with a seed
population of 0.1% infected, under the assumption of an R0 of 2.67 and γ of
1
8.5 . The contour lines indicate the cost fraction, i.e. what fraction of the cost of
social distancing cd the cost of illness ci must be in order to make not distancing
a preferred strategy.
3.2 Marginal utility of social distancing
Based on the key epidemiological dynamics data on the SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic, [12,21] the highest marginal effect of social distancing takes place in the
same early timeframe of approx. 2-3 γ−1 days. Unsurprisingly, even without
integrating the time-dependent discount factor proposed by Reluga (2010), [20]
the numerical solutions indicate that the effect of social distancing is most sig-
nificant where it is not yet a widely adopted strategy: for SARS-CoV-2, based
on an initial population of 10,000 with a seed population of 0.1% infected, the
greatest marginal utility is encountered where less than 20% of the population
is engaged in social distancing, and the effect is significantly less noticeable once
δ(P, t) reaches 0.5 (Figure 3).
Calculations of marginal utility matter because they can guide public policy
in determining what fraction of the population may feasibly be exempted from
social distancing while still maintaining much of the benefit. Given the need for
critical services, swuch as urgent medical care, emergency services and critical
supply chain activities to continue even in the throes of a pandemic, marginal
utility calculations based on empirical data on an outbreak may, along with the
societal response (as expressed by δ(P, t), which can be empirically ascertained
as well), contribute to more accurate public health measures while limiting the
effect of such measures on the economy and on day-to-day life.
3.3 Costs and strategy choices
The accurate direct and indirect costs both of social distancing and of failing
to do so are notoriously difficult to quantify accurately. Indeed, many of these
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costs are by their very nature not amenable to quantification. At the same time,
by quantifying the relative ratio of cost of distancing (cd) and cost of illness (ci),
we can identify a strategy-associated cost ratio φ that, given approximations or
empirical estimates of those costs, can assist in societal decision-making with
regard to social distancing. As Figure 4 shows, for most cases, the cost of
social distancing would have to exceed the cost of illness by at least an order
of magnitude to make it a preferable strategy. In addition, the computational
solution of Equation (16) shows not only that failure to socially distance may
only be a preferable choice if the costs of distancing vastly exceed the costs of
illness, but that this remains the case for much of the short term (¡90 days).
Estimates of direct medical costs of COVID-19 are difficult, but at least one
study puts the median cost of a symptomatic infection at US$3,045 in direct
costs alone, [22] typically compounded by loss of earnings, long-term physical
harm, reduction in life expectancy and quality of life and, in severe cases, the
risk of mortality. The costs of social distancing are much less amenable to
quantification, as these costs are primarily governed by indirect factors and
intangibles, such as the cost of deferred medical treatment, second-order effects
of the psychological burden inherent in decreased social interaction and the
cost of lost revenue. While quantification, thus, of both the cost of distancing
and cost of illness remains an outstanding subject of research, the cost fraction
calculations can assist in reasoning about the best social strategy in view of
these factors once ascertained or estimated.
4 Discussion
Pandemics pose a significant challenge to public health and social decision-
making, and the COVID-19 pandemic is by no means an exception. Non-
pharmaceutical interventions, such as social distancing, play a significant role
in the arsenal of tools that public health authorities can bring to bear on an
epidemic that is otherwise not amenable to treatment or prophylaxis. Thus,
until a vaccine or a reliable therapeutic, ideally with prophylactic properties, is
found, non-pharmaceutical interventions are poised to remain the mainstay of
public health activity in the face of COVID-19. In view of this, an increased un-
derstanding of the way NPIs that rely on social distancing affect the statistical
dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 in a population is essential for sound decisin-making.
This paper discussed a subject that is not devoid of controversy, both in the
scientific and in the public realm. By their nature, NPIs interfere with citizens’
day-to-day lives and may have complex economic, social and psychological ef-
fects. It is therefore important that strategy options are adequately explored
from a quantitative perspective. It is hoped that in reinforcing the case for
social distancing through an analysis of the statistical dynamics that underlie
it, this paper can add to growing body of knowledge in support of social dis-
tancing as an effective and cost-efficient NPI where other tools are unavailable
or inappropriate.
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